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This study analyzes how market imperfections affect land productivity in a 
degraded low-potential cereal-livestock economy in the Ethiopian highlands. A wide 
array of variables is used to control for land quality in the analysis. Results of three 
different selection models were compared with least squares models using the HC3 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Market imperfections in labor 
and land markets were found to affect land productivity. Land productivity was positively 
correlated with household male and female labor force per unit of land. Female-headed 
households achieved much lower land productivity than male-headed households. Old 
age of household heads was also correlated with lower land productivity. Imperfections 
in the rental market for oxen appeared to cause overstocking of oxen by some 
households. Conservation technologies had no significant positive short-run effect on 
land productivity. The main results were consistent across the different econometric 
models. 
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4 are common in rural markets in developing countries 
(Hoff et al. 1993; de Janvry et al. 1991) and the efficiency implications of market 
imperfections have been a controversial issue since Marshall claimed that share tenancy 
was an inefficient institutional arrangement (Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 1974). Singh et al. 
(1986) developed the separable farm household model as a benchmark approach to the 
analysis of rural economies. This model was based on the assumption of perfect markets, 
except for one market, that of land.  de Janvry et al. (ibid.) developed a more general 
theoretical model, allowing for market imperfections in rural economies. The presence or 
absence of market imperfections may have significant efficiency and other policy 
implications. The resource distribution is likely to be important for the existence of and 
participation in rural factor markets.  
There have been few studies of the efficiency of factor markets in Africa (Udry 
1996). Barrett (1996), Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) and Collier (1983) found an inverse 
relationship between farm size and efficiency in Madagascar, Niger and Kenya. Gavian 
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and Fafchamps (1996) found that yields were strongly influenced by the manpower 
available to farm households in Niger, indicating that marginal returns to land and labor 
are not equalized across households. Udry (1996) found evidence of imperfections in 
labor and land markets in Kenya and of imperfections in capital and insurance markets in 
Burkina Faso. Gavian and Ehui (1999) found in a study in Ethiopia that total factor 
productivity was lower on rented land but that input intensity was not different on rented 
land. Other studies of efficiency in agriculture in Ethiopia (Suleiman 1995; Croppenstedt 
and Mamo 1996; Asfaw and Admassie 1996) have studied the efficiency of each farm, 
which is different from our focus on whether factors are allocated efficiently across 
farms. Of the above studies, only Udry (1996) controls for land quality when testing the 
efficiency of factor markets.  
In this study, we test whether factor markets are able to eliminate the potential 
inefficiencies which may accrue due to unequal distribution of factors in a low potential 
crop-livestock economy in the Ethiopian highlands where land has been reallocated to 
ensure equity in land distribution but where other resources, especially livestock, have 
not been subject to redistribution policies. We use farm plot level data and control for a 
wide array of plot level land quality characteristics. We assess whether after controlling 
for prices and plot characteristics, there remains a significant correlation between land 
productivity and household (resource) characteristics, so that we can test the hypothesis 
of perfect factor markets. We test the robustness of the results by applying different 




We develop a conceptual framework for the analysis, including some tentative 
hypotheses, in part 2 of the paper.  In part 3 we describe the case study area and data, 
while the estimation procedures are described in part 4. The results and discussion follow 
in part 5, leading to a conclusion in part 6. 
 
 2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Our basic hypothesis is that high transaction costs and imperfect information 
cause market imperfections and non-separability of production and consumption 
decisions in poor rural economies. With perfect markets and perfect information, land 
productivity would only be a function of exogenous output and input prices (pj), where 
subscript  j refers to outputs and inputs, and land characteristics (Aq):  ) , ( A P q j ￿ ￿ = .  
Factor market imperfections may reduce land productivity at plot level. We may illustrate 
this in a simple theoretical model as follows. We assume that crop output ( q ) is a 
function of land (A), labor (L) and oxen (O ) (traction power), q = q(A,L,O). With one 
market imperfection, e.g. a missing market for land, the utility maximizing problem of 
the land user may be formulated as follows: 
(1)  U = V(p cq(A,L,O) -p wL -p rO) 
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where Pc is the price of the output, Pw is the wage rate, and Pr  is the rental rate for oxen. 




prices and land characteristics:  ) , ( ￿ ￿ = A P q j However, if we have imperfections for two 
of the factors, e.g. missing markets for land and labor, we get inefficiencies if the input 
ratios vary across farms and the inputs are imperfect substitutes. For example, assume for 
simplicity that there is low substitutability between these inputs. In the (extreme) case of 
no substitutability (Leontief production function), one of the fixed inputs will be binding 
and the marginal return to the other will be zero
5. There will be a non-utilized portion of 
the non-binding fixed input (cause of inefficiency). If land is the binding factor for one 
household, the marginal return to labor will be zero and there will be underemployment, 
and if family labor is the binding factor for another household, the marginal return to land 
will be zero and the household will not utilize all its land. In this case, it is easy to show 
that land productivity at the plot level in a cross-section of households
6 will be a function 
of the household specific fixed factors: 
(3)  ) , ( L A ￿ ￿ =  
  The household specific fixed factor ratios determine which factor is binding in 
each household. Econometrically, this may be tested for by using the factor ratio as an 
independent variable,  ) , , (
A
L
A Aq ￿ ￿ =  Missing markets is an extreme case of market 
imperfection. The intermediate case with a price band, some selling, some self-sufficient, 
and some buying households for each factor may be a more realistic representation of 
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and labor in constant returns to scale production.  
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factor markets in Ethiopia where there are rental markets for land and oxen and also a 
labor market. Price bands reflecting transaction costs may accrue due to search costs and 
moral hazard (labor markets), immobility of land and transportation costs (land markets), 
moral hazard and seasonality/timing constraints (oxen rental markets) and so forth. We 
may illustrate this with an extension of our simple model: 
(4)  U =V(pcq(A,L,O)-py
i A-pw
i L-pr
i O)  
where   ˛ i {s, *, b) s denotes households selling the factor, * denotes self-sufficient 
households, and b denotes households buying the factor. Actual factor use may be as 
follows: 
(5)  A = A + Ai, L = L + Li, O = O + Oi 
where A is the operated farm size,  A is the owned farm size, and A
i is the land rented in 
or out (negative if rented out), and similarly for the two other factors. The utility 
maximization problem then becomes: 




and yields the following first order condition for the land factor: 




























We have that  P P P
b s
Q Q Q < <
* .  The implication of this is that marginal 
productivity of land for each household depends on whether the household is a seller, 
self-sufficient, or buyer of the various factor inputs. There is an inverse relationship 
between resource price and resource demand. If different households face different price 
ratios, this affects land productivity at the plot level. Empirically, we may test whether 
land productivity at the plot level is a function of owned farm size, household labor force 








L A ￿ ￿ = . If any of these 
variables are significant, this is a sign of factor market imperfections and significant 
transaction costs. On the other hand, if these factor endowments are insignificant, this 
may indicate that factor markets function reasonably well or that factors are in abundant 
supply for all. 
We specify a reduced form productivity function, based on the theory outlined 
above:  










Equation 8 says that if there are market imperfections, land productivity at the plot level 
is a function of a vector of farm plot characteristics (Pq), farm size (A), family labor per 
unit of land (
L
A ), oxen per unit of land (
O
A ), a vector of technologies (Tq) applied at plot 
level, and a vector of household characteristics (Ch). Implicit in this formulation is the 




Variable input levels are assumed to be endogenous and a function of the same factors as 
profit in equation (8).  
Bhalla (1988) and Benjamin (1995) argued that unobservable land quality may 
explain the frequently observed inverse farm size-productivity relationship. Larger farms 
tend to be less fertile and therefore also less productive. By including a large number of 
land quality variables we hope to control for this land quality bias. However, there may 
still be unobservable land quality factors and if these are correlated with observed 
explanatory variables, like plot size, we have a omitted variable bias. It may lead to type I 
error; we may reject the perfect markets hypothesis when it is correct. If this problem is 
worse on large plots (poorer quality) than on small plots, plot quality will be negatively 
correlated with plot size (Udry 1996). We have included plot size to attempt to control for 
this possible bias. Following Udry (1996) we have also subtracted the plot size from the 
farm size and included the area of other household plots rather than total farm size. This 
specification eliminates the potential technological explanation (decreasing returns to 
scale) on a given plot for the inverse relationship. 
We may distinguish between profit-maximization in the short run and in the long 
run and there may sometimes be tradeoffs between the two as short-term profit 
maximization may undermine long-term profits. This was found to be the case in the 
study area (Shiferaw and Holden 1998). In this study we focus on short-term profit 
maximization decisions as we have data only for short-term land productivity measured 
in monetary terms. In this short-term perspective it may appear irrational that households 




Households may also allocate plots for grazing, grassland, or for tree planting. We 
were unable to measure the output on these plots. Yet the decision to crop or not to crop 
(to leave the land fallow, for grazing, grassland, or tree planting) may also be affected by 
other variables than those determining short-term profits. Tree planting may be very 
profitable in the long run but not in the short run. Leaving a plot fallow for another year 
may reduce short-term profits but increase long-term profits. Grass production or using 
land for grazing may be profitable in the short run also but we were unable to measure 
this profit. Some households who do not have oxen may fail to cultivate a plot because 
they lack oxen and fail to rent in oxen. Asymmetric information and transaction costs 
may also cause them to fail to rent out these plots. These factors may cause a selection 
bias that may cause a type II error; we fail to reject the perfect factor market hypothesis 
when it is false. We estimated selection models (censored regression models) to attempt 
to control for such a potential selection bias. 
 
3. CASE STUDY AREA, DATA, AND VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 
The data were collected from a sample of 102 households in seven villages in a 
highly degraded crop-livestock farming system in the Ethiopian highlands (Andit Tid, 
North Shewa, 50-60 km from Debre Berhan). The survey was carried out in 1998. Farm 
plot level data were collected for 606 farm plots, which included all the plots of the 
sampled households. Data from 598 plots were used in the analysis. Out of these, 461 
plots were cultivated and planted with crops during 1997. The data included biophysical 




farm level. We have earlier analyzed data from a 1994 survey in the same area focusing 
on resource degradation and adoption of conservation technologies (Shiferaw and Holden 
1998). This study goes further and considers the existence of market imperfections and 
how they affect the returns to cropping. An overview of the biophysical, technology and 




Table 1--Overview of variables used in the analysis. 
Variable name  Variable 
type 
Variable definition  Mean  St.dev 
Nprodvaha  Cont.  Net production value, Birr/ha, dependent variable  478.731  291.156 
Village   Dummies  6 dummy variables for 7 villages     
Soil type  Dummies  8 dummy variables for 9 soil types     
Land type  Dummy  1=outside treated catchment area  0.746   
Plot size  Cont.  Area of plot in ha  0.559  0.395 
Distance  Cont.  Distance from home to plot (km)  0.971  0.979 
Slope  Cat.  1=flat, 2=foothill, 3=midhill, 4=steep hill  1.951  0.851 
Soil depth  Cat.  1=shallow(<30cm), 2=medium, 3=deep(>60cm)  1.482  0.679 
Land quality  Cat.  1=poor, 2=good, 3=very good  1.622  0.633 
Susceptibility  Cat.  to erosion: 1=very high, 2=high, 3=low, 4=none  2.594  0.646 
Degradation  Cat.  1= very high, 2=high, 3=low, 4=none  2.633  0.926 
Zone  Cat.  1=dega zone, 2=wurch zone (high altitude)  1.354  0.479 
Season  Dummy  0=meher, 1=belg (short rains)  0.248   
Tradit  Dummy  Traditional ditches in the plot, 0=no  0.749   
Cut-off drain  Dummy  1=cut-off drain in the plot, 0=no  0.635   
Waterway  Dummy  1=waterway in the plot, 0=no  0.005   
Boundary  Dummy  1=boundary planting around the plot, 0=no  0.662   
Bunds  Dummy  1=bunds in the plot, 0=no  0.276   
Fanya juu  Dummy  1=funya juu (conservation structures),0=no  0.125   
Crop: Barley  Dummy  1= Barley, 0=Wheat     
Crop: Other  Dummy  1=Other crops (non-cereals), 0=Wheat     
Sex of hh head  Dummy  0=female, 1=male  0.912   
Age of hh head  Cont.  Years  49.56   
Type of house  Dummy  1=corrugated iron roof, 0=thatched roof  0.235   
Educat  Cont.  Education of household head, years  1.039  1.978 
Educavg  Cont.  Average education, persons > 16, years  0.977  1.091 
lnvariable  Cont.  Log of variable     
lnvariable2  Cont.  Log of variable squared     
dvariable  Dummy  1 if variable=0, 0 if variable>0     
Oxenha  Cat.  Oxen owned by the household per ha  0.461  0.343 
TLUsuboxha  Cont.  Tropical livestock units excluding oxen per ha  1.102  0.726 
Malelabha  Cont.  Household male labour force per ha  0.563  0.424 
Femlabha  Cont.  Household female labour force per ha  0.423  0.283 
Subtrarea  Cont.  Farm size minus plot size  2.377  0.932 
Consunitha   Cont.  Consumer units based on nutritional requirem.  1.834  1.171 
Manurha  Cont.  Manure on plot in baskets/ha  1.681  6.794 
DAPcha  Cont.  DAP fertilizer on plot, cost in Birr/ha  0.238  1.586 
Ureacha  Cont.  Urea fertilizer on plot, cost in Birr/ha  0.098  1.08 
Rentin  Dummy  1 = rented in plot, 0 = other plots  0.074   
Rentout  Dummy  1 = rented out plots, 0 = other plots  0.064   
Crop 96le  Dummy  1 = if plot was planted with legume in previous year  0.145   
Crop96fa  Dummy  1 = if plot was fallow in the previous year  0.249   




“Profit” could not be measured directly as prices of non-traded inputs were 
endogenous and could not be revealed easily. Instead, for each plot the value of gross 
output minus the cost of purchased inputs was used as the dependent variable. 
The fact that cross-section data from a fairly small area were used for the analysis 
should control for most of the output price variation. Distance from the home to the plots 
and village dummies were used to control for the remaining local price variation. The 
village dummies should also control for most of the local climatic variation. The year for 
which the data were collected had good rainfall and prices were therefore also normal and 
stable and should not deviate significantly from the expected prices of rational farmers. 
To eliminate the potential bias introduced by crop choice and price and input use 
differences among crops, we also carried out an additional analysis for the dominant crop 
in the area, barley. We did this analysis for the 270 plots planted with barley. Crop 
diversity, even if land productivity in monetary terms is significantly different for 
different crops, may be a sign of market imperfections, causing a subsistence orientation 
in production. However, this could also be due to agro-climatic differences (which we try 
to control for) and a deviation between short term and long-term objectives (e.g. crop 
rotation may reduce short term productivity but enhance long term productivity). 
Uninsured production and price risks (limited insurance markets) may also be another 
important explanation (Barrett 1996). 
Conservation technologies have been introduced in the area through projects. In 




find a mix of externally introduced and traditional technologies. Dummy variables were 
specified for the existence of each of these at the plot level to control for their influence. 
Very few of the plots received fertilizer and credit was not available during the 
1997 cropping year in the study site. Fertilizer use is considered very risky at this high 
elevation and households are therefore reluctant to buy it. Only twenty out of the 598 
plots received fertilizer, of which 16 received only DAP and the remaining ones received 
both DAP and urea. The low number of plots and the fact that there may be a selection 
bias related to plots selected for fertilizer use makes it impossible to get reliable estimates 
of the effects of fertilizer on land productivity. 
Manure was applied to some of the plots (101 out of 598 plots). We had no good 
instruments to predict manure use as most variables that could determine its use are 
already in the model. We ran the regression with and without it. The variable was not 
significant (Table 4). 
Most land rental arrangements in the area involve share tenancy. Marshallian 
inefficiency may cause lower input use and lower profit on plots that are sharecropped 
(Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 1974). To test for this, dummy variables were included for plots 
rented in and rented out. Selection bias may, however, invalidate this test. It is therefore 
necessary to interpret the signs on these dummy variables with care.   There were 30 out-
rented plots and 43 in-rented plots in the sample. 
Off-farm income may affect land use decisions and short-term profitability in 
several ways. Access to off-farm income may provide resources for farming as the 




may take labor away from farming activities if hired labor is an imperfect substitute for 
family labor and there are significant search and monitoring costs related to hiring of 
labor. Access to off-farm income may also reduce interest in farming. The effect of 
access to off-farm income on the profitability of land use is therefore ambiguous. The 
problem of estimating the effect of off-farm income on land use profitability is that off-
farm income may be endogenous and we have no good instruments to estimate it. We 
expect that many of the variables included in the analysis of land use profitability will 
also influence the off-farm income of households. Omitting off-farm income from the 
analysis may also leave us with an omitted variable bias, however. We therefore ran the 
model with and without the off-farm income variable.  
There is a fairly strict gender division of labor in the study area and some farm 
activities are carried out by men only. We therefore divided the labor force by gender. 
Such cultural restrictions reduce the substitutability of male and female labor and the 
scarcity of one type of labor may cause inefficiency unless the labor market works well. 
We also included a dummy variable for sex of household head. Female-headed 
households face special problems because they usually have insufficient male labor and 
oxen. Nine out of the 102 households were female headed. They had on average only half 
the amount of male labor per ha and less than one third the amount of oxen per ha of that 
of male headed households. Since we are already controlling for these differences, 
however, then any significant difference due to the sex of household head variable would 




To control for selection bias we needed to identify some unique variables for the 
selection equation. Identification requires
7 that at least one continuous variable is unique 
in the switching equation (Deaton 1997). We decided to use the following variables as 
instruments in the selection equation: 
1.  Fallow 96: land fallowed in the preceding year is likely to be fallowed also the 
year under study. 
2.  Legume 96: land planted with legume in the previous year is likely to be cropped 
this year as the legume is planted to improve the soil for the following crop. 
3.  TLUsuboxen/ha: tropical livestock units, excluding oxen, (livestock population 
pressure) may affect the area planted with crops or used for grazing. 
4.  Oxen/ha: Oxen are important for land cultivation and may contribute to an 
increase in the probability of cropping when factor markets are imperfect. On the 
other hand, oxen also require fodder and that increases the probability that plots 
are left for grazing or grass production. 
 
We cannot rule out that these variables also influence farm productivity directly, 
but this effect is uncertain.  
 
4. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
To test for selection bias in relation to choosing plots for cropping we estimated 
the following censored sample selection model: 
(9)    ] [ ' n b+ = ￿ x d  
where the dependent variable is determined by the regressors x, an unobservable error 
term v, and the indicator variable d, which determines whether the dependent variable is 
                                                 




censored (plot is not used for cropping) or not. This indicator variable is assumed to be 
determined by a vector of conditioning variables, z, through a binary choice model: 
(10)    ] 0 [ 1
' ˛> + = g z d  
where 1[C] denotes an indicator function for the event C (cropping),  gis a vector of 
unknown coefficients, and ˛ is an unobserved error term. This model may be estimated 
in several ways. The classical parametric approach has been based on normality 
assumptions for the error terms: 
), , 0 ( ~ s n N   ), 1 , 0 ( ~ N ˛ r n = ˛) , ( corr    
Estimating the first equation by ordinary least squares would yield biased estimates when 
0 „ r . The Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976) has been the standard model for 
correcting selection bias. It provides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for 
all parameters in such models.  
For positive values of  ￿ the regression function is: 
(11)    ￿ ￿ + = > E ) ' ( ' ) 70 , , | ( g l b z x z x  
where the last term is defined as: 
(12)    l(z’g)=E(v| e‡-z’g) =rs 0(j(z’g/s2))/(F(z’g/s2)) 
where j(￿) and F(￿) are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal 
distribution, s0 and s2 are the two standard deviations, and r  is the correlation 
coefficient. 
Given normality, the lfunction can be represented by the inverse Mills’ ratio 




Following the recommendation of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.545) we used ML 
for the estimation. The Heckman selection model relies on strict normality assumptions, 
however, and is sensitive to heteroskedasticity.  
We tested for heteroskedasticity, using the Cook and Weisberg (1983) tests, 
which showed the presence of heteroskedasticity. We tried linear, log-linear and 
(reduced
8) translog functional forms in an attempt to eliminate the heteroskedasticity 
problem. We were unable to eliminate these problems. However, the translog functional 
form gave the lowest  X
2 values for heteroskedasticity and was therefore preferred. To 
handle zero levels of inputs we created dummy variables (=1 for nonusers) and used 
zeros in the log-transformed data for these rather than setting arbitrary small values that 
may bias the results.  
We tested for normality of error terms using skewness and kurtosis tests as well as 
the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests for normality (Gould and Rogers 1991; 
Gould 1991)
9. The tests showed significant departure from normality. Given the 
problems of heteroskedasticity and non-normality, we used two alternative models for 
robust estimation of the selection models to assess the sensitivity of the results to 
different econometric approaches. To relax the normality assumptions of the Heckman 
selection model, Deaton (1997) suggested using a polynomial form of the predicted 
probabilities of the binary choice model, rather than the inverse Mill’s ratio from the 
binary choice model. The polynomial may then be regarded as an approximation to 
                                                 
8The interaction terms of the translog form were not included as they resulted in severe multicollinearity. 
9 This was based on the recommendation of an anonymous reviewer. Normality tests for the censored data 





whatever the true lfunction should be. The prevalence of heteroskedasticity and 
violation of the normality assumption in this model was controlled for in the least squares 
models by using the conservative heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix  
estimation (HCCME) named HC3 (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) for standard error 







(14)  X X X h t t ˆ ) ˆ ' ˆ ( ˆ 1 - =   ' X t         
 
is the t
th diagonal element of the “hat” matrix that projects orthogonally onto the space 
spanned by the columns of X .  This method has generally performed well in Monte Carlo 
experiments and is considered better than the White/sandwich method (Davidson and 
MacKinnon 1993, p.554). 
We also tried a third method for robust estimation of the censored model. This 
method is called Powell’s censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimator (Powell 
1984) and provides consistent parameter estimates. It is considered a desirable alternative 
due to its robustness to conditional heteroskedasticity and distributional misspecification 
of the error term (Chen and Khan 2000). We may write the model as follows: 
(15)    ￿ + = + = ) ' , 0 max( ) ' ( 1 n b n b x x  




(16)    ￿ = ) ' , 0 max( ) | ( 50 b x x q  
where  ￿ ) | ( 50 x q  denotes the median of the distribution conditional on x and the median 
of v is assumed to be 0.  bmay be consistently estimated by the parameter vector that 
minimizes: 
(17)    | ) ' , 0 max( | ￿- S b x   
Knowledge of the distribution is not required for consistency, and 
homoskedasticity is not assumed. Median regressions are used repeatedly, first on the 
total sample and later on a truncated sample. In each iteration observations with negative 
predicted values are eliminated, until the procedure converges. Standard errors are finally 
estimated through bootstrapping (resampling households in our case). This approach 
tends to create larger variances (less efficient) than least squares methods and a fairly 
large sample size may be required for it to be useful (Deaton 1997). In our case we have a 
sample size of 102 households and this may be fairly small, but at least it allows us a 
comparison with the results of the other estimators. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our basic hypothesis was that imperfect information and high transaction costs 
cause factor market imperfections in the type of resource-poor rural economy we have 
studied. Factor markets are not able to eliminate the inefficiencies due to unequal 
distribution of factors if this is the case. We tested this by seeing whether land 
productivity at plot level depended on farm size, household male and female labor force, 




The results of the probit model, whether to crop or not to crop, are presented 
in Table 2.  
Table 2--Maximum likelihood Probit Model: To crop or not to crop 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent    Parameter    p>|z|      dy/dx 
Variables    Estimate           
Village2         0.4395        0.065           0.063 
Village3       -0.2886      0.295      -0.056 
Village4     -0.3249      0.379      -0.066 
Village5     -0.8505      0.002      -0.195 
Village6      0.1810      0.609       0.028 
Village7      0.0058      0.977       0.001 
soiltype_2    -0.2424      0.275      -0.043 
soiltype_3    -0.2692      0.412      -0.052 
soiltype_4     0.2980      0.233       0.045 
soiltype_6    -1.4373      0.005      -0.451 
soiltype_7      0.7979     0.010       0.080 
soiltype_9      1.5937     0.112      -0.516 
slope       -0.4218     0.000      -0.071 
landtype       0.6090     0.013       0.103 
zone       -0.4485     0.022      -0.075 
lnplotsize      0.1854     0.153       0.031 
distance       0.0083     0.916       0.001 
soildept        0.2958     0.036       0.050 
landqual       0.8873     0.000       0.150 
suscept        0.1219     0.350       0.021 
degradat      -0.2547     0.016      -0.043 
cutoff        0.7160     0.000       0.139 
waterway      0.7217     0.187       0.075 
boundary      0.4964     0.007       0.093 
bunds           0.1599     0.351       0.027 
fanyaju        0.2425     0.430       0.036 
sex       -0.4476     0.128      -0.058  
age        0.0065     0.211       0.001 
house       -0.5514     0.000      -0.112 
lneducat     -1.0230      0.049      -0.173 
lneducavg     -0.1309     0.184      -0.022 
lnmalelabha      0.0243     0.935       0.004 
lnfemlabha      0.8249     0.113       0.140 
lnconsunitha      0.5612     0.010       0.095 
lnoxenha    -1.0627      0.013      -0.180 
lnsubtrarea     0.3386      0.167       0.057 
lntlusuboxha    -0.0842      0.705      -0.014 
lntlusubox2    -0.0745      0.394      -0.013 
lnoxenha2    -0.6000      0.028      -0.102 
lnconsu2    -0.2353      0.121      -0.040 
lnmalelabha2    -0.1573      0.210      -0.027 




lneducavg2    -0.1345      0.120      -0.023 
lneducat2     0.3577      0.139        0.061 
deducavg     0.0541      0.812        0.009 
deducat       0.2229      0.288        0.038 
dmalelabha     0.4787      0.454        0.059 
dfemlabha    -0.1102      0.822       -0.020 
doxenha     -0.5102      0.171       -0.107 
doffincha     0.4103      0.046        0.064 
lnoffincha     0.1268      0.023        0.021 
rentin        1.194       0.030        0.103 
rentout          1.097      0.009        0.098 
crop96le       1.609      0.000        0.137 
crop96fa     -0.6665      0.001      -0.139 
Constant     -0.2673      0.793  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable: 1=plot used for cropping, 0=plot is not cropped.  Number of obs.=593, Wald 
chi2(55)=381.65, Prob.>chi2=0.0000,Log likelihood = -202.23, Pseudo R2 = 0.3691, standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on hhno, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The model 
predicted 91% of the cropped plots and 67% of the uncropped plots correctly.   
 
We found that households with better houses (corrugated iron roof), and better 
educated heads were less likely to use their plots for cropping. Households without off-
farm income were more likely to use their plots for cropping while higher off-farm 
income increased the probability of cropping for households with off-farm income. 
Human population pressure (consumer units/ha) increased the probability of cropping. 
For households with oxen, more oxen per unit of land reduced significantly the 
probability of cropping. Households without oxen were less likely to use their plots for 
cropping but this effect was insignificant. This may indicate an abundance of oxen for 
households with oxen as oxen do not contribute to increasing the cultivated area but 
rather demand that more land is used for fodder production. Plots planted with legumes in 
the previous year were more likely to be cropped and plots fallowed in the previous year 
were less likely to be cropped. Rented plots were more likely to be cropped. A number of 
the biophysical and technology characteristics also influenced whether a plot was 




controlling for land quality with this wide array of land quality variables, provides 
evidence of significant market imperfections. The following models provide further 
evidence. 
We present the results of Heckman’s selection model (H), Deaton’s alternative 
model (D), and Powell’s CLAD estimator (P) in Table 3 and the results of the least 




Table 3--Determinants of land productivity: Heckman model with maximum 
likelihood estimation and Deaton’s censored regression model 
  Heckman Model  Deaton’s Model  Powell’s Model 
Variables  Coef.              P>￿ z ￿          Coef.            P>￿ t ￿ *  Coef.         P>￿ t ￿  ** 
slope  0.681  0.195  -0.0078  0.916  0.0121  0.882 
season  -0.2207  0.074  -0.3600  0.015  -0.2239  0.296 
landtype  -0.0564  0.663  -0.0047  0.973  0.1464  0.386 
zone  0.1739  0.210  0.0353  0.772  0.0008  0.997 
Inplotsize  -0.3519  0.000  -0.2858  0.000  -0.3507  0.000 
distance  0.0444  0.242  0.0179  0.650  -0.0113  0.837 
soildept  0.0174  0.768  0.0114  0.865  0.0252  0.759 
landqual  -0.1451  0.051      0.0744  0.446  0.0715       0.455 
suscept  0.0501         0.454  0.0529  0.531  0.1007  0.327 
degradat  0.1515         0.005  0.0658  0.217  0.0605  0.368 
tradit  0.1008         0.236  0.0846  0.414  0.1161  0.346 
cutoff  -0.3370         0.000  -0.1408  0.151  -0.1249  0.225 
waterway  0.137         0.779  0.3916  0.060  0.2915  0.798 
boundary  -0.2208        0.010  -0.0713  0.424  -0.1453  0.254 
bunds  -0.0636  0.459  -0.0273  0.767  0.0687  0.549 
fanyaju  -0.1082         0.461  -0.3403  0.051  -0.0670   0.753 
Crop: Barley  -0.0884  0.458  -0.1163  0.338  -0.2457  0.128 
Crop: Other  -0.2960         0.009  -0.3995  0.002  -0.3575  0.032 
sex  0.4889         0.006  0.5589  0.002  0.6749  0.004 
age  -0.006  0.035  -0.0076  0.063  -0.0101  0.058 
house  0.064  0.511  -0.0961  0.376  -0.1914  0.188 
Ineducat  0.1552     0.596  -0.3044  0.343  -0.1902  0.649 
Ineducavg  0.0881        0.153  0.1058  0.105  0.0516  0.536 
Inmalelabha  0.3902         0.011  0.2723  0.076  0.3110  0.151 
Infemlabha  0.4000         0.130  0.5046  0.094  0.5040  0.180 
Inconsunitha  -0.245    0.104  0.1831  0.387  0.1724  0.424 
Insubtrarea  0.2266  0.059  -0.1994  0.108  -0.1286  0.462 
Inconsu2  -0.1600        0.136  -0.3203  0.040  -0.1894  0.214 
Inmalelabha2    0.1348  0.063  0.1270  0.107  0.1851  0.093 
Infemlabha2    0.2624  0.020  0.2823  0.027  0.2814  0.092 
Ineducavg2  -0.0011         0.982  0.0015  0.976  0.0270  0.678 
Ineducat2  -0.0336  0.810  0.1632  0.286  0.1131  0.553 
deducavg  -0.1951  0.195  -0.2414  0.129  -0.2410  0.226 
deducat  -0.1327  0.194  -0.0915  0.445  -0.0010  0.942 
dmalelabha  0.0112  0.967  0.4319  0.118  0.2000  0.631 
dfemlabha  0.6035  0.098        0.5481  0.278  0.8937  0.154 
doffincha  0.0404  0.749  0.1972  0.114  0.0056  0.972 
Inoffincha  0.0016         0.976  0.0423  0.207  0.0050  0.919 
rentin  -0.0264   0.841       -0.0877  0.627  0.0728  0.697 
rentout  -0.1239  0.403       -0.1025  0.541  0.0564  0.848 
constant  5.955  0.000  8.5740  0.242  5.6284  .000 
athrho  -1.245  0.004  p1 -8.6808   0.766     






Number of obs     =   598             481        472                
Censored obs       =   137     
*Based on robust HC3        
**Based on boot-  
Uncensored obs   =   461                    standard errors      strapped st.errors 
Wald chi2(46)     =  140.47                R-squared = 0.70    Bootstrap reps.: 1000 
Log likelihood    = -650.4791             F(58, 422) = 69.67          Pseudo R-sq. = 0.19 
Prob > chi2         =  0.0000                Prob>F  = 0.0000 
LR test of indep. eqns.(rho = 0):       Cook-Weisberg test: 
chi2(1) = 3.18 Pr>chi2 = 0.0747   Chi2(1)=2.86, P=0.0909 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Not reported but included: 6 village dummy variables (all models) and 8 soil type dummy variables (D and 
P models only as Stata failed to solve the Heckman model with all the soil type dummies). The variable 
athrho is atanh r=0.5ln((1+r)/(1-r)), and r is the correlation between the error terms in equations (9) and 
(10). Lambda refers to l in equations (11) and (12) and is sometimes called the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). 
The variables p1, p2 and p3 refer to the first, second and third order polynomials from the selection model. 




Table 4--Determinants of land productivity: Cropped plots and Barley plots 
            All Cropped Plots                          Barley Plots 
Variables  Coef.  P>￿ z ￿   Coef.            P>￿ t ￿ * 
slope  -0.0027  0.970  0.0333  0.632 
season  -0.2641  0.074  -0.3491  0.074 
landtype  0.0692  0.616  -0.0190  0.902 
zone  0.0023   0.987  0.2408  0.254 
Inplotsize  -0.3580  0.000  -0.3787  0.000 
distance  0.0402  0.350  -0.0534  0.237 
soildept  0.0280  0.657  0.1239  0.078 
landqual  0.0454  0.507  -0.0301  0.689 
suscept  0.1121  0.184  0.1463  0.096 
degradat  0.0708  0.182  0.0392  0.509 
tradit  0.0892  0.387  -0.0420  0.720 
cutoff  -0.2289  0.009  -0.1920  0.047 
waterway  0.5154  0.043  0.3765  0.245 
boundary  -0.1181  0.225  -0.1205  0.343 
bunds  -0.0039  0.967  0.0101  0.917 
fanyaju  -0.0505  0.784  0.0268  0.883 
Crop: Barley  -0.1018  0.412     
Crop: Other  -0.3015  0.017     
sex  0.5054  0.007  0.6047  0.005 
age  -0.0072  0.108  -0.0101  0.042 
house  -0.0620  0.552  -0.1031  0.390 
Ineducat  -0.1724  0.628  -0.0737  0.869 
Ineducavg  0.0839  0.239  0.1213  0.098 
Inmalelabha  0.3962  0.027  0.3914  0.043 
Infemlabha  0.5265  0.085  0.6166  0.050 
Inconsunitha  -0.0491  0.763  -0.0833  0.659 
Insubtrarea  -0.1113  0.422  -0.2001  0.210 
Inconsu2  -0.2225  0.060  -0.3107  0.022 
Inmalelabha2  0.1410  0.089  0.1947  0.047 
Infemlabha2  0.2951  0.021  0.2140  0.127 
Ineducavg2  0.0205  0.707  -0.0034  0.953 
Ineducat2  0.1067  0.522  0.0684  0.741 
Inoffincha  0.0311  0.393  -0.0141  0.733 
rentin  0.1495  0.365  0.4135  0.023 
rentout  0.0169  0.924  0.2046  0.300 
lntlusuboxha    0.1235  0.450  0.0831  0.697 
lntlusubox~2  -0.0237  0.738  -0.0279  0.746 
lnoxenha  -0.1587  0.579  -0.0529   0.856 
lnoxenha2  -0.1481  0.454  -0.0278   0.901 
lnmanurha   -0.0181  0.804  0.0208  0.796  
lndapcha  -0.2716  0.371  0.0311  0.921 
lnureacha  0.2019     0.521  0.2226  0.472 





Number of obs    461                          270 
F(67,393)                 2.41      F(63,206)  2.53 
Prob > F     0.0000          0.0000 
R-squared    0.2727          0.4195 
Cook-Weisberg test: 
Chi2(1)      8.84          0.08 
Prob > Chi2    0.0029          0.7737 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
* Results of village and soil type dummies and zero input value dummies are not included in the table. 
 
** Based on HCCME robust(HC3) standard errors.  
 
 The H model indicated that there was significant correlation between the error 
terms in the two equations (under the assumption of normality). With the D model we did 
a Hausman test of the model with the three polynomial terms against the model without 
them.  The was no significant effect.  We therefore have conflicting evidence of 
selectivity bias since the H model confirms it and the D model rejects it. There is a risk of 
type I error, however, that we reject the selection bias hypothesis when it is actually true. 
We therefore did the analysis for both the cases to test the robustness of the results. By 
presenting the results of the three selection model approaches jointly, and by comparing 
them with the models assuming no selection bias, and judging the consistency of the 
results, we arrive at conclusions with higher confidence than we can by relying on only 
one of the approaches. 
The sex of household head variable was highly significant (1% level) in all the 
selection models as well as the least squares models with HCCME (HC3) corrected 
standard errors. The land productivity was 49-67 % higher on plots operated by male-
headed households than on land operated by female-headed households. The age of 
household head variable had a negative sign in all models and was significant in four out 
of the five models (at 5% level in two and 10% level in two). Land productivity is 




male household labor variables had positive parameter signs in all models. The linear 
term was significant in four of the models (5% level in three, 10% level in one). The 
squared term was significant in four models as well (5% level in one, 10% level in three). 
All models had at least one of the terms significant. Also the linear and squared log terms 
for female labor had positive parameter estimates in all models. The linear terms were 
significant in three of the models (5% level in one, 10% level in two) while the squared 
terms were significant in four models (5% level in two, 10% level in two). All models 
had at least one of the terms significant.  This is strong evidence that land productivity is 
increasing with household male and female labor force, implying that labor and land 
markets do not operate efficiently. This is similar to what Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) 
found in Niger.  
The farm size variable (lnsubtrarea= farm size - plotsize) had a negative sign but 
was significant only in one model. There is therefore only very weak evidence of an 
inverse farm size-productivity relationship. One reason may be the relatively egalitarian 
land distribution due to the Ethiopian land reform that causes fairly small variation in 
farm size within communities in Ethiopia. The plot size variable was highly significant 
and with a negative sign in all models. This may be due to unobservable land quality 
correlated with plot size as suggested by Udry (1996). It could also be due to a bias in 
plot size estimation. We used plot size data based on official local estimates used during 
land distribution. We have more recent data that indicate that the plot sizes in the area are 




Oxen per unit of land were included only in the selection equation in the selection 
models. In the least squares models the linear as well as the squared log terms had a 
negative sign but were insignificant. This may indicate that oxen were in abundant supply 
or that oxen sharing arrangements work well, so that oxen ownership does not affect 
productivity.  Holden and Shiferaw (2000) estimated that on average the oxen in the 
study area worked at 60% of their capacity in the busiest season.  
Farm level population pressure (linear and squared terms of log consumer 
units/ha) appeared to have a negative effect on land productivity. The parameter 
estimates of the linear and squared terms were negative in three of the models, while 
there was one positive and one negative parameter in the other models. Three of the 
squared terms were significant (negative), two at 5% level and one at 10% level. None of 
the linear terms were significant. Considering that population pressure increased the 
probability of cropping, this may imply that population pressure reduces fallowing and 
this may affect land productivity negatively when we have controlled for the higher labor 
inputs that also result from higher population pressure. Again, the significance of 
variation in farm-level population pressure is a sign of market imperfections.  
We found no evidence of lower land productivity on rented plots. Land 
productivity was significantly higher (5% level) on rented in (mainly sharecropped) 
barley plots. Rented plots were more likely to be cropped and there is a danger of 
selectivity bias. Nevertheless, the analysis provides no evidence of share-tenancy leading 
to lower land productivity and sub-optimal input use. The small number of plots being 




land, however. This appears to contribute to the systematic variation in labor/land ratios 
across farms that affect land productivity as land and labor are likely complements rather 
than substitutes, and markets for both function imperfectly. 
Monetary land productivity was significantly lower (30-40%) for non-cereal crops 
than for cereals
10.  The fact that households still preferred to grow these crops may be due 
to market imperfections causing a subsistence orientation of production, but may also 
partly be explained by positive crop rotational benefits on land productivity that is not 
captured in this short-run analysis. It is doubtful that these rotational benefits are larger 
than the 30-40% lower average land productivity for the non-cereal crops, however, 
lending support to the market imperfections hypothesis.   
Village, household and farm characteristics variables were used to predict off-
farm income
11.  We found no significant effect of off-farm income on land productivity. 
This in combination with the low level of fertilizer use may indicate that cash scarcity is 
not the primary constraint to fertilizer adoption. 
Introduced conservation technologies did not increase short-term profits and this 
may be an important explanation why farmers in the area have started to remove these 
technologies (Shiferaw and Holden 1998). It is possible though that the positive long-
term responses to conservation technologies appear through the positive effect on land 
productivity from the lower level of degradation. 
                                                 
10 Wheat was the reference crop. Two dummy variables were used, one for barley and one for other crops. 
11 These variables were not transformed into logarithmic form. Off-farm income was censored and a two-




We present the results of the normality tests for the least squares models in Table 
5.  
Table 5--Normality tests for residuals in models 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                  Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality of error terms 
                                                 ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |              Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)     adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Deaton model           0.000         0.000             40.38         0.0000 
All crops model +e    0.000         0.014          18.29       0.0001 
All crops model -e     0.000         0.001         32.60      0.0000 
Barley model +e        0.153         0.347             2.95       0.2286 
Barley model -e       0.232         0.831              1.49      0.4754 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |              Obs        W                  V                  z           Prob>z 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Deaton model           481       0.96998           9.751  5.465    0.00000 
All crops model +e   461       0.98508       4.665  3.688    0.00011 
All crops model –e   461       0.97464       7.930  4.959    0.00000 
Barley model +e      270        0.99347       1.268  0.551  0.28978 
Barley model –e      270        0.99644       0.692          -0.860  0.80524 
________________________________________________________________________ 
+e: includes potentially endogenous input variables 
    -e: excludes potentially endogenous input variables 
 
We see that normality holds only in the barley model. The unobservability of 
error terms in the H model prevents testing for heteroskedasticity and normality in this 
model but the significance of the heteroskedasticity and non-normality in the least 
squares models gives reason to be cautious.  Overall, the parameter values were not 
systematically different in the heteroskedasticity-robust D and P models. The main results 





We have used three different selection models and two least squares models with 
HCCME (HC3) correction of standard errors to test whether there are significant market 
imperfections affecting land productivity at the farm plot level in a degraded crop-
livestock economy in the Ethiopian highlands. The persistence of heteroskedasticity and 
non-normality of error terms under different functional forms and the possibility of 
selection bias in the data created a need to test the robustness of the results to different 
econometric specifications. Based on a comparison of the results of the different models 
we derive the following conclusions. 
 The results indicate clearly that there are significant market imperfections in 
labor and land markets in the study area and that these imperfections affect plot level land 
profitability. A wide array of variables has been used to control for land quality that may 
have caused an overestimation of inefficiencies in other studies (Suleiman 1995; Bhalla 
1988; Benjamin 1995).  Household male and female labor per unit of land had a 
significant positive effect on land productivity, showing that the labor market and the 
rental market for land do not redistribute these resources efficiently. The econometric 
analysis provides no evidence of inefficiency in the oxen rental market as the oxen 
variable is insignificant, but additional data do so. An insignificant resource stock 
variable is a necessary but not sufficient indicator of efficient resource allocation for this 
resource. We should therefore be careful and not jump to the conclusion that oxen rental 
markets are functioning efficiently. There were signs of overstocking of oxen according 




Lumpiness of this factor of production, as a pair of oxen is required for ploughing, and 
imperfections in the rental market for oxen (Holden and Shiferaw 2000) may explain this 
inefficiency.  Female-headed households faced special problems as their land 
productivity was much lower than that of male-headed households. Resource poverty and 
poor substitutability between factors of production may explain this discrepancy. Old age 
of household heads was also causing lower land productivity. 
Shiferaw and Holden (1998) found that population pressure created incentives to 
remove externally introduced conservation structures in the study area. This study reveals 
no positive land productivity response to these conservation technologies and that land 
productivity declines with population pressure (consumer units/ha).  
Even though land productivity increased with household labor force, we did not 
find a significant inverse farm size-land productivity relationship
12, as often has been 
observed in other studies. The reasons for this may be that farms managed by female 
headed households are smaller than average and with lower productivity and that 
population pressure had a negative effect on land productivity. The land redistribution 
policy in Ethiopia has also caused an egalitarian distribution of land resources, making it 
more difficult to find a significant inverse farm size-land productivity relationship 
because of the narrow range of farm sizes. 
Policies that can improve the labor market and the rental markets for oxen and 
land may reduce the inefficiencies we identified in this study.  There appears to be little 
to gain in terms of increased land productivity by continuing the land redistribution 
                                                 
12 We tested this by leaving out the resource endowment variables in the analysis. The farm size variable 
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